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true in actions for breach of contract or in tort actions involving property.
In such actions, settled principles of law as applied to the established facts
indicate the properly recoverable amount.24 A jury verdict for less is im-
proper and is not consistent with the jury's determination of liability. The
jury, upon finding defendant liable, has found him liable, in effect, for the
damages the law deems proper under those particular circumstances, and
no less.
There is in both categories of cases a restriction of the jury function, for
all practical purposes, to a determination of liability. This, however, means
merely that the jury does not make a separate, discretionary finding, within
limits, of the amount of recovery, as in cases where the damages are unliq-
idated. In the case where the damages are certain, as regards the consti-
tutional right to a jury determination of damages, the determination of
liability carries with it a determination of damages. In one category of case
this result follows from the nature of the cause of action. In the other cate-
gory it follows from operation of law. Hence, if there is no doubt as to the
validity of the verdict regarding the right to recover, it seems additur may
properly be allowed in California in cases where the damages are certain
and computable.
In litigation involving commercial transactions additur would be avail-
able to correct an inadequate verdict in a case where the damages are cer-
tain. As a practical matter, additur should be kept in mind as a device which
will insure a proper recovery to the successful litigant without the delay
and expense of a new trial.
Paul H. Cyril*
24 Carlin, supra note 1, at 6.
* Member, Second Year Class.
MITIGATION: SotmcFs AND APPLicAnoNs oF RuLE IN CATOPO TNA; Am=rC-
IPAToRY BRFAcH CASES
It is well grounded in California law that the innocent party to a breach
of contract must seek to mitigate the loss which he is in danger of suffering,
or suffer the expense of this avoidable loss himself.' "His right to compensa-
tion is limited to the amount of the harm that he cannot reasonably avoid."
2
He is under a legal disability to collect more than this for his injury.3
Although less often the subject of definition and refinement in California
law, a corollary to this rule has been established. The innocent party has a
right to compensation for the injury and expense he suffers in the reasonable
I Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 844, 147 P.2d 558, 560 (1944); Schultz
v. Town of Lakeport, 5 Cal. 2d 377, 382-83, 54 P.2d 1110, 1113, 55 P.2d 485 (1936);
Murphy v. Kelly, 137 Cal. App. 2d 21, 31, 289 P.2d 565, 571 (1955); Johnson v. Comp-
toir Franco Belge D'Exportation Des Tubes D'Acier, 135 Cal. App. 2d 683, 689, 288
P.2d 151, 155 (1955).
25 CoBBiN CorTRAcrs note 4 at 26 (Supp. 1959).
S McComacK, DAmAGEs 128 (1935).
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attempt to mitigate his damages, even if his attempt is not successful. 4 This
corollary must follow if the innocent party is to be protected from the un-
foreseeable results of his reasonable attempt to do what the rule of mitiga-
tion of damages requires.
Sources of Rule
The California statutes do not make an express statement of this rule,
but the courts have reasoned that it is implied from the sections of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code which relate to damages.
In Scott's Valley Fruit Exchange v. Growers' Refrigeration Co., the court
stated that, "the duty to minimize damages is predicated upon the statutory
rule that a person is required to use reasonable care to prevent an unwar-
ranted piling up of damages."5 There is no such express statement in the
codes, but section 3359 of the Civil Code states that damages must be rea-
sonable, ". . . and where an obligation of any kind appears to create a right
to unconscionable and grossly oppressive damages, contrary to substantial
justice, no more than reasonable damages can be recovered."
On another occasion, in Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., the court stated that,
"the essence of the rule denying recovery for losses which could have been
prevented by the reasonable efforts and expenditures of plaintiff is that his
conduct rather than that of defendants proximately caused such losses."6 If
this is the case, statutory support for the rule of mitigation may be found in
those sections of the Civil Code which speak of damages, "proximately
caused." The principal one among these is section 3300, which provides:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of dam-
ages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount
which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately
caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely
to result therefrom. (Emphasis added.)
However well these sections serve as a basis for the rule of mitigation of
damages, it is clear that they do little to clarify or control the application of
the rule. It has been the court itself which has supplied these limits.
Anticipatory Breach and Mitigation
Cases of anticipatory breach of a contract raise a difficult problem in
determining the application of the rule of mitigation of damages. Although
the California law generally recognizes the rule of mitigation of damages,
the questions whether to apply this rule from the time of the repudiation
of the contract, or from the time of the acceptance of the repudiation as an
anticipatory breach. Does the rule of mitigation of damages limit the right
of the innocent party to elect to stand on the contract until time for
performance?
A dictum in Bomberger v. McKelvey,7 an important 1950 decision by the
California Supreme Court, indicates that the court is -villing to hold that such
4 Seid Pak Sing v. Barker, 197 Cal. 321, 240 Pac. 765 (1925); Olcovich v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., 179 Cal. 332, 176 Pac. 459 (1918); Menefee v. Raisch Improvement Co.,
78 Cal. App. 785, 248 Pac. 1031 (1926).
581 Cal. App. 2d 437, 451, 184 P.2d 183, 191 (1947).
6 23 Cal. 2d 840, 846, 147 P.2d 558, 561 (1944).
7 35 Cal. 2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950).
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a limit does exist when the innocent party is interested only in the profits to
be gained from the contract. However, the limit was not applied in this case
because the innocent party had other interests in the contract. Earlier cases
in the lower courts are not entirely convincing on this point.
Cases involving the anticipatory breach of a contract for the sale of goods
by the seller raise an additional problem. If the buyer's right of election is so
limited, does his reasonable effort to mitigate his damages ever include the
responsibility to make another forward contract for delivery at a future date?
In Guerrieri v. Severini,8 a 1958 Supreme Court decision, the buyer's dam-
ages were not limited by his failure to purchase other goods within several
hours after the repudiation of the contract. It is not clear whether the court
meant that it will not limit the buyer's right to elect to stand on the contract,
or whether it meant that the buyer's reasonable effort does not require him
to make another contract, because the court held that the lower court's find-
ings that the buyer failed in a reasonable effort to mitigate his damages was
not supported by the evidence. It is possible that the court intended to imply
only that the facts of this particular case would not support such a conclusion.
Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane0 a federal district court case de-
cided under California law prior to the Bomberger decision, seems to take
the view that the rule of mitigation of damages does not limit the buyer's
right of election in contracts for the sale of goods.
In United States v. U.S. Foreign Corp.,10 a federal district court in an-
other jurisdiction applied the corollary to the rule of mitigation of damages
and measured the innocent buyer's damages by taking the difference be-
tween the price in the broken contract and the price in a second forward
contract which he made before the time for delivery under the old contract.
The court rejected the argument that section 67 of the Uniform Sales Act
(which is reproduced as section 1787 of the California Civil Code) applied
to such a situation. The reasons given by the court for its decision echo
the California Supreme Court's reasons for supporting the rule of mitigation
of damages and suggest that this court might also disregard the statutory
provision under similar circumstances.
Comparative Economic Advantages
It is the economic advantages of the rule of mitigation of damages which
insures its survival. It is desirable to halt the effects of a broken contract
with a minimum loss to society as a whole." Under the present rule, both
of the parties to the contract, in seeking to avoid personal loss, also reduce
the chance of loss to society.
The California Supreme Court has indicated that if these advantages do
not apply to the case before them, they will not apply the rule.
In Bomberger v. McKelvey,12 plaintiff sought to recover, in addition to
damages on another contract, the agreed price in a contract for the demoli-
tion and removal of a building. Defendants were planning to use the lots
where the building stood as a parking lot for customers of a chain store
851 Cal. 2d. 12, 330 P.2d 635 (1958).
079 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
10 151 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
11 McCommcK, D AmAGs 128 (1935).
12 35 Cal. 2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950).
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which they intended to construct nearby. In their agreement with the plain-
tiff, they promised to pay $3,500 to him on the demolition and removal of
the building. The plaintiff agreed to destroy and remove the building as
soon as practicable after it was vacated by the present tenants, and not later
than twenty days before the completion of the chain store nearby.
The trial court found that the plaintiff had relied on being able to use
the skylight and plate glass windows from the building in the construction
of a new building at another location; that the defendants knew of this re-
liance; that these items could not be purchased elsewhere within 90 or 120
days; that there was an implied covenant by the defendants to allow the
plaintiff to have possession of the premises for the purpose of removing the
old building; and that defendants had stated that the old building had no
value to them in the light of their plans.
The defendants, in August, 1946, notified plaintiff that he was not to
begin work on the old building. Plaintiff replied that he intended to perform
as agreed. Defendants sent him notice that he would be treated as a tres-
passer if he came on the land for this purpose. The court found that this was
a final repudiation of the contract by the defendants.
In October, plaintiff removed the skylight and plate glass from the old
building and the tenants abandoned the premises. In November, plaintiff
continued to demolish and remove the building, completing the job in that
month. When defendants refused to pay the agreed price for the work, plain-
tiff brought suit and recovered that amount, in addition to damages on
another contract which was in issue. Defendants appealed.
Defendants' argument was based on the rule that either party to an
executory contract has the power to stop performance of the contract by
notifying the other party of this intent. In doing this they acknowledged
that they became liable for damages, but they urged that the other party
must mitigate the damages and could not continue to perform and recover
damages based on the full contract price.
The Supreme Court emphatically supported this view as the general rule,
but stated an exception to it.13
The reason for this rule is twofold: Ordinarily a plaintiff is interested only
in the profit he will make from his contract, and if he receives this he obtains
the full benefit of his bargain; on the other hand, performance by the plaintiff
might be useless to the defendant, although he would have to pay the entire con-
tract price if the plaintiff were permitted to perform, and this would inflict dam-
ages on the defendant without benefit to the plaintiff.... If these reasons are not
present, the rule is not applied. (Emphasis added.)
The court held that an essential element in the reason for applying the rule
was lacking, in that the plaintiff was not solely interested in profit, but
required parts of the old building for use in his construction of the new
building.
Drawing an analogy between plaintiff's possible grounds for specific per-
formance under these facts, and his justification for continuing performance,
the court refused to apply the rule of mitigation of damages. On this basis,
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court for the plaintiff.
13 Id. at 614, 220 P.2d at 733.
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The Supreme Court indicated that it would apply the rule of mitigation in
cases of anticipatory breach of contract from the time that notice is given
of the repudiation, so long as the basic reasons for the rule apply. It seems
justified to conclude that later decisions by this court are not based on a
refusal, as a matter of law, to apply this limit on damages unless the con-
trary is expressly stated.
Two previous decisions by the District Court of Appeal for the Second
District also support this view.
Atkinson v. District Bond Co.14 involved a controversy between a con-
struction company and a bond company. On March 16, 1931, the construc-
tion company agreed to bid for certain street improvement work in Santa
Barbara and to perform the work if the contract was awarded. The bond
company agreed to buy the bonds issued in payment of the work at ninety-
six per cent of their par value and to loan the builders up to seventy-five per
cent of the price to be paid for the work at seven per cent per annum.
The builders submitted a bid for $44,174.80. The defendants then gave
notice that they withdrew from the contract. Through a mistake made on
the signing of the bid, the contract was awarded to R. C. Atkinson instead
of the firm of Atkinson and Reish, which had made the bid.
On April 18, 1931, in response to a request by the builders, the bond
company made a definite statement of their intention not to perform the
contract, which the builders refused to accept as a breach of the contract.
The city council rescinded its award of the contract and re-advertised
for bids on the work. The builders submitted a bid in the firm name for
$49,009.32 which was accepted on June 18, 1931.
The builders, on June 20, 1931, made an agreement with another bond
company in which they were to perform as before. The bond company
agreed to buy the bonds at eighty-three per cent of their par value and to
loan the money at a higher rate of interest.
The builders' position was that they had a right not to accept the repudi-
ation by the bond company until after they had acted in reliance on the
contract by submitting their second bid. The trial court found for the builders
on this basis. It awarded damages based on the difference between the con-
tracts with the bond companies.
The district court of appeal reversed this decision. It pointed out that
at the time of their second bid on June 18:35
... [P]laintiffs were under no obligation to defendants to perform the agree-
ment by again bidding for the work, as defendants had repudiated it, and they
had no right to go on and thereby increase the damages for such breach. Nor
were plaintiffs under any legal duty to bid again for the work. It therefore
becomes manifest that it was error to assess damages on the basis of evidence
of the subsequent bid and awards and bonds issued thereon. The damages, if
any other than nominal, which will compensate plaintiffs must be ascertained
under the theory of repudiation and not under that of subsequent performance.
The court stated as a matter of law that "after an absolute repudiation
or refusal to perform by one party to a contract, the other party cannot con-
tinue to perform and recover damages based on full performance."' 6
14 5 Cal. App. 2d 738, 43 P.2d 867 (i934).
15 Id. at 745, 43 P.2d at 870-71.
•16 Id. at 745, 43 P.2d at 870.
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In Richardson v. Davis,17 relied on in the Atkinson case, the plaintiff
agreed to run thirty feet of advertising film three days a week in the Southern
Pacific and Key Route waiting rooms for two years. The defendant agreed
to pay fifteen dollars a week for this service. The contract was made on Feb-
ruary 27, 1928. On April 26, 1928, the defendant notified the plaintiff that
the contract was to be terminated on May 1, 1928. The plaintiff continued
to show the film after this time and sued on the contract at the end of the
two year period. The trial court awarded him damages based on the rate of
fifteen dollars a week for the balance of the period.
In reversing this decision, the district court of appeal held that the
notice of April 26 was a repudiation of the contract. It stated that "when
such is the case, the order must be for damages for the breach and not for
services rendered under the contract after the repudiation."18 The court
quoted a Utah case, which stated that "it is true that the damages may equal
the amount stipulated in the contract under certain circumstances, but if
that be so, then the fact must be established by proper evidence. It cannot
be established by merely proving that the plaintiff proceeded to perform
after the renunciation had been made."19
The Atkinson case would stand more strongly for the proposition that
the innocent party's right to compensation is limited by his failure to miti-
gate his damages from the time of repudiation, if the court had stressed the
differences between the two cases. In the Richardson case the repudiation
made the failure to pay the next monthly bill a present material breach.
Damages figured from the time of repudiation, or from the material breach
would amount to the same thing. This differs at a critical point from the
Atkinson case, where the principal issue concerns the conduct of the plain-
tiff between the time of the repudiation and the time at which he elected to
treat it as a breach by contracting with the second bond company.
Breach by Seller
In cases involving the anticipatory breach by the seller of a contract for
the sale of goods, it is not the performance of the innocent party which is in
question but rather the nonperformance. In the cases discussed above, the
innocent party is accused of proceeding in the face of the repudiation with
the direct result that he suffers greater damage from the broken contract. In
the innocent buyer's case, the injury is indirect. Determining that the injury
could have been avoided requires a more complex analysis. Was it possible
to make a new contract at all? If so, was the plaintiff unreasonable in not
making it? Setting aside the economic factor, how may the contract breaker
fairly question the right of the innocent party not to enter into contractual
relations with someone else?
The indirectness of the economic loss, the difficulty of measuring the
reasonableness of the buyer's action, and the fairness of the contract breaker's
demands are factors which naturally make the courts hesitant to put the
buyer under a greater risk of doing the wrong thing. But this does not deter-
mine if the courts are ever willing to so limit the innocent buyer's recovery.
17 116 Cal. App. 388, 2 P.2d 860 (1931).
18 Id. at 391, 2 P.2d at 861.
19 Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 95, 151 Pac. 543, 544 (1915).
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Guerrieri v. Severini 20 involved the anticipatory breach of a contract for
the sale of goods by the seller. The seller, on March 27, 1953, agreed to deliver
200,000 gallons of wine before August 1, 1953. The buyers agreed to pay
thirty-six cents a gallon in cash for the wine. Several days later, the seller
called the buyers' agent and told him that he would not be able to deliver
the wine. The trial court found that this was an anticipatory repudiation of
the contract, and that this repudiation was not withdrawn later in the con-
versation. The Supreme Court cast serious doubt on the sufficiency of the
evidence to support this latter conclusion, but assumed that this was true in
order to reach a further point.
The buyers did not accept the repudiation as final at this time and the
parties made an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate for delivery of at least
part of the wine. By April 29 the buyers also had bought 74,000 gallons of
wine of this quality on the open market. On that date, they bought a winery
in order to get the quantity and quality of wine which they required to make
up the 200,000 gallons contracted for. The Supreme Court held that this
purchase by the buyers constituted an election by the repudiatees to treat
the repudiation as an anticipatory breach of the contract.
The trial court found that, on the day of the seller's repudiation, there
were over 200,000 gallons of wine on the open market of a similar quality
and at the same price as that contracted for by the buyers. On this basis it
held that the buyers' damages were nominal. The Supreme Court held that
the evidence did not support this conclusion. The evidence showed that the
wine was only on the market for a few days; that the buyer had previously
examined the wine and rejected it in favor of the seller's wine; and that the
wine on the market was "unfinished" wine, while the wine contracted for
was "finished" wine. This was a difference in processing which cost about
two cents a gallon. The trial court bad supported the seller's argument that
the buyer was obligated to seek to mitigate his damages from the time of
the repudiation. The Supreme Court reversed, stating: 21
If we were to hold, as contended for by the defendant, and as found by the
trial court, that plaintiffs were required, on the day Severini repudiated the con-
tract, to buy immediately within the hour, wines of lesser quality than that con-
tracted for, and which had been previously rejected by them, we would be
depriving the promisee of his election to treat the repudiation as a breach or
continue to stand on the contract and would be forcing him to accept the re-
pudiation as a breach of contract in violation of the rules of law [on anticipa-
tory breach] heretofore set forth.
The Supreme Court fixed the buyers' damages as the difference between the
purchase price he had paid for the wine and the contract price. There was
evidence that there had been an unseasonable frost in the early part of April
and that wine of the same quality was selling for as high as fifty-five cents
per gallon after this time. The court cited section 1787 of the California Civil
Code which states in part that the measure of damages is ". . . the difference
between the contract price and the market or current price of the goods at
the time or times when they ought to have been delivered, or if no time was
fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver." The court concluded, "It
20 51 Cal. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 635 (1958).
21 Id. at 18, 330 P.2d at 638-39.
NOTESNov., 1960
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
would be unreasonable and unpracticable, under the facts here presented to
require plaintiffs, within an hour of the breach by anticipatory repudiation
by Severini, to buy unfinished wine inferior in quality which had previously
been rejected by them, in order to mitigate the damages caused by defend-
ant's breach."22
In this decision the Supreme Court did not definitely hold as a matter of
law that it would not limit the right of election by the innocent party. The
court only refused to do this under the facts herein. But in the light of the
dictum in the Bomberger case, it is not likely that the court intended to
limit the rule of mitigation of damages in this way.
It is more difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court would, under
the proper facts, hold that the buyer must make another forward contract
in the reasonable effort to mitigate his damages. However, it may be argued
that the court would not have considered the sufficiency of the evidence on
this point, if they believed that it was clearly not possible as a matter of law.
An earlier case, U.S. Trading Corp. v. New Mark Crain Co.,23 in the dis-
trict court of appeal, while not touching directly on the issue of mitigation,
implies that the rule is limited as a matter of law. As in the preceding case,
no specific date was set for the delivery of the goods. The court, without the
aid of section 1787, which was added to the Civil Code in 1931, held that
the damages should be measured from the date that the repudiation became
a present total breach.
In this case, plaintiff sued on two contracts, made in June 1919, whereby
defendant agreed to deliver 3,000 tons of barley within a reasonable time on
board railroad cars in Southern California for shipment to New Orleans. Pur-
suant to this agreement, defendant had delivered all but 500 tons of barley.
The federal government then issued an order requiring every shipper of
barley from Southern California to ports on the Gulf of Mexico to obtain a
permit from the Southern California Export Committee as a condition preced-
ent to shipment. This order remained in force until about November 1, 1919.
Both parties tried unsuccessfully for a permit. After considerable corre-
spondence, defendant sent a telegram to plaintiff on October 7, 1919. In this
telegram, defendant offered to give plaintiff warehouse receipts for an
amount of barley equal to that which remained to be delivered under the
contract. He warned that if such a tender should not be accepted by the
plaintiff before noon of the following day, the contract would be treated as
cancelled. There was no tender of the receipts by the defendant and there
was evidence which indicated that defendant was not in position to make
good on this offer. Plaintiff did not accept.
On November 12, 1919, plaintiff requested a delivery of the balance of
the barley and defendant made a definite refusal to proceed under the con-
tract. The plaintiff bought 500 tons of barley soon after this time at a cost
greater by $5,816.34 than that set in the contract.
The defendant argued that there was a repudiation of the contract on
October 7,1919; and since the date of delivery was indefinite, the damages
should be determined on the basis of the market price of barley at that time.
If there was a repudiation, the plaintiffs position was that he had the right
22 Supra note 20 at 23, 330 P.2d at 642.
2356 Cal. App. 176, 205 Pac. 29 (1922).
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to elect to ignore any such repudation on defendant's part until the time
when the necessary permits became available, or the embargo expired.
Therefore, the damages should be measured on the basis of the market price
of barley at the time the embargo expired.
In supporting the decision of the trial court for the plaintiff, the district
court of appeal stated: 24
... [T]he rule is that if, before the time when the buyer may rightfully de-
mand delivery, the seller gives notice of an intention not to deliver, the market
price as of the date when the delivery may rightfully be determined by the
buyer will govern, and not the market price on the date of such notice of an-
ticipatory breach.
The Supreme Court denied a hearing to the defendant.
This case cannot be weighed heavily on the question of limiting the
application of the rule of mitigation of damages. It is not clear that the
defendant raised the question of mitigation at all, and no evidence was of-
fered that plaintiff could have bought other barley during the embargo. It
is not even clear that there was a definite repudiation of the contract on
October 7. It is not disputed that the rule for measure of damages is stated
correctly by the court in the absence of facts which give rise to the possible
application of the rule of mitigation of damages.
The application of the rule was directly put in issue by the defendant in
Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane.25 There, the buyer sought to recover
damages for the failure of Crane and Kazonjian to deliver three carloads of
grapes which had been contracted for by the plaintiff. Crane appealed to the
federal district court from an order of the Secretary of Agriculture which
affirmed the award of the board in favor of the buyer, dismissing the case
against Kazonjian. (Counsel stipulated that the substantive law of California
should control.)
The fruit company accepted the offer made by Crane to sell three car-
loads of grapes on October 3, 1944. Shipment was to be made to the buyer
in Kentucky on approximately December 10, 1944. Payment, excepting a
small down payment, was to be made at this time. In a letter dated Octo-
ber 10, 1944, Crane and Kazonjian repudiated this agreement. Between this
time and the date set for delivery, the buyer made several attempts to get
the sellers to comply with the contract, which they refused to do. As soon
after December 10 as possible the buyer purchased other grapes. The price
paid exceeded the contract price by $5,723.50 and the board awarded the
buyer this amount in damages.
The sellers argued that when they made the repudiation of the agree-
ment, the buyer was required "to go out and secure grapes and he had no
business waiting until December 10."2 6 They urged that plaintiffs unreason-
able failure to mitigate its damages in this way should place it under a dis-
ability to collect more than the difference between the market price at the
time of repudiation and the contract price. The buyer's position was that it
was under no such disability and that damages should be measured as set
forth in section 1787 of the California Civil Code.
24 Id. at 191, 205 Pac. at 36.
25 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
2 Id. at 130.
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The district court held that the measure of damages for anticipatory
breach is to be computed on the basis of the time fixed for performance, and
not on the basis of the time notice of the repudiation was received. The
court quoted section 1787 and section 3354 of the Civil Code. The latter
section provides that the value of property to the buyer shall be the pur-
chase value, ". . . at such a time after the breach of duty upon which his
right to damages is founded as would suffice, with reasonable diligence, for
him to make such a purchase." In upholding the decision of the board, the
court stated that the buyer ". . . was not obligated to anticipate, at his peril
that the cost of grapes would be less prior to December 10, 1944 than after-
wards; in other words, that he could wait until delivery time and then pur-
chase at the best price obtainable and recoup his loss by way of damages."27
The district court took the view that the California Code sections on
measure of damages cover the point. However, there is no reason why the
code provisions on measure of damages should be to limit the mitigation of
damages. The district court did not have the decision by the California Su-
preme Court in the Guerrieri case before it at this time. It is significant that
the Supreme Court, in the later case, makes no such automatic application
of the code provisions. Full consideration of the defendant's case for mitiga-
tion of damages is given before section 1787 is applied.
Nevertheless, section 1787 of the California Civil Code continues to loom
as an important factor in these decisions.
In United States v. United States Foreign Corp.,28 a federal district court
in another jurisdiction stated that the same provision (originally section 67
of the Uniform Sales Act) does not apply to the corollary of the rule of miti-
gation of damages. This court allowed the buyer to make another forward
contract without taking the risk that the price would fall by the date of
delivery. He was protected from this limitation so long as the new contract
was reasonable at the time it was made. The problems in applying this rule
are not the same as those in applying the rule of mitigation, but the relation-
ship of these rules to the codificatons of the measure of damages is similar.
In the United States v. United States Foreign Corp. case, defendant seller
committed an anticipatory breach of a contract with the government for the
sale of grain. The government, in seeking to mitigate its damages, re-adver-
tised for bids and let a new contract to the low bidder. At the trial, the
government offered no evidence of loss except the difference between the
old and new contract prices.
The defendant urged that the government was not entitled to this differ-
ence, but should have submitted evidence of the price of the grain on the
open market on the delivery date. The court ruled that section 67 of the
Uniform Sales Act did not apply and found the amount of damages based
on plaintiff's argument. In reaching this decision the court stated:29
... [T]he commercial necessities are clear. In situations in which supply
arrangements must be made in advance of need, the buyer must look elsewhere
for his goods when his seller repudiates the contract prior to delivery. He cannot
wait until the delivery date before making other arrangements without incurring
additional losses for lack of the needed item.
27 Ibid.
28 151 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
29 Id. at 660-61.
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The government had to have flour for export at certain ports at a certain
time ....
For these reasons, the ability to make and rely upon contracts for future
performance is essential. To hold that such contracts may be breached before
the time for performance without liability for the higher cost of alternative
arrangements would seriously affect the reliability of this type of contract, and
with it, the efficiency of our economy.
This realistic evaluation of the economics of the situation was reflected
by the California court in the Bomberger case. Both courts have the same
reasons in mind for applying these rules. Faced with the same commercial
necessities, it is not unlikely that the California court would reach the same
conclusions with regard to the application of section 1787 of the Civil Code.
There is certainly no absolute barrier to holding that section 1787 does not
limit the application of the rule of mitigation of damages.
Conclusions
The rule of mitigation of damages is part of the California law. Because
it is not defined by the Civil Code, the courts must make their own limits
for the application of the rule. These limits are not fully defined by the
present cases, but it is clear that the courts give great weight to the economic
forces behind the rule.
At the present time it has been established that the rule of mitigation of
damages limits the right of election in cases of anticipatory breach where
the innocent party makes a further performance in reliance on the contract.
The courts have not yet decided in favor of a defendant who argued that
the buyer had a responsiblity to make another forward contract, but the
cases presented have not been the strongest.
The decision in the Denunzio case takes an approach which is not fol-
lowed by the California Supreme Court in the Guerrieri case, although both
courts found in favor of the buyer.
Section 67 of the Uniform Sales Act, reproduced in the California Code
as section 1787, has not prevented a federal court from applying the corollary
of the rule of mitigation and it is not likely to stop the California courts. The
restriction of the Supreme Court on its rulings of law to the facts at hand
in the Guerrieri case, make it likely that the court will entertain further
cases where the law is more clearly in issue.
This decision, together with that in the Bomberger case, indicates that
the Supreme Court is balancing the administrative difficulties of extending
the rule to a new area, and the economic justice which would result from
applying the rule in a case where the reasons behind the rule come squarely
into play.
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